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Available online 19 April 2006This paper addresses the risk of time inconsistency in economic appraisals related to the
use of hyperbolic discounting (declining discount rates) instead of exponential discounting
(constant discount rate). Many economists are uneasy about the prospects of potential time
inconsistency. The paper discusses whether they have reason to be uneasy. The answer is
no. The risk of reversing previous recommendations due to the passing of time alone is not
severely larger for hyperbolic discounting than it is for exponential discounting. And it can
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Government commitments1. Hyperbolic discounting and the concern for
dynamic consistency
Discounting is an indispensable part of economic appraisal of
government policies, programmes, and projects. As indispens-
ableas it is, recent economic research reveals that the traditional
exponential method of discounting fails to reflect the certainty-
equivalent discount factor when there is uncertainty about the
future rate of economic growth and thus the future rate of
alternative returns.This isparticularly important inappraisalsof
programmes aimed at conversion from environmentally unsus-
tainable patterns of production and consumption to sustainable
ones since the effects of such conversions extend beyond the
lifetime of present generations where returns to alternative
resource use are fundamentally uncertain. The issue of dis-
counting the distant future is thus intertwined with the issues
surrounding the appraisals of environmental programmes and
of the balance between future and present generations.ier B.V. All rights reserveThe alternative to exponential discounting is hyperbolic dis-
counting characterised by using a declining rather than a constant
discount rate— at least for discounting beyond the near future.
A declining discount rate does, however, imply a dynamic
inconsistency in the sense that the trade off between consum-
ing in one year rather than in the following years look smaller
when regarded at an earlier point of time than when the choice
is about the present consumption. This pointwas already noted
by Ramsey (1928). Since then, it has been a central point in the
view on discounting in mainstream economics:
Using a discount rate that depends on the period over which
the analysis is being conducted is not without problems. For
one thing, it leads to time-inconsistent decisions: plans that
people will not follow if given the opportunity to reconsider
their actions. This property of hyperbolic discounting func-
tionsmakesmany people uneasy about their use in benefit–
cost analysis. Portney and Weyant (1999).d.
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inconsistency a good reason for rejecting the use of declining
discount rates in cost–benefit analysis?
The paper starts with a brief summary of some of the most
important problems in exponential discounting. The third
section presents the alternative, hyperbolic, discounting
whereas the problem of dynamic inconsistency is introduced
in Section 4. The seriousness of the problem is addressed in
Sections 5 and 6 discussing respectively the risk of inconsis-
tent economic advice in appraising the overall net-benefits of
a long term programme and in recommendations of a time
profile of implementation of such a programme. The conclu-
sion states that the uneasiness is weakly founded.2. What is the problem with exponential
discounting?
There is no consensus amongst economists about the appro-
priate level of the social discount rate. There is even dis-
agreement as to whether there should be different discount
rates for different goods, sectors, and financing arrangements.
Basic economic theory explains the rationality of discount-
ing by consumption time preference and alternative returns to
investment. It does, however, also explains a wedge between
the two rates of discount due to taxes and asymmetry of
information.
Against this background two alternative approaches to
discounting have evolved. Consumption discounting uses the
social rate of time preference (SRTP) defined as the sum of the
rate of pure time preference and the rate of marginal increase
in welfare by increasing consumption. Opportunity cost
discounting uses the social opportunity cost (SOC) derived
from an appropriate sample of market rates of return to
investment.
In both cases there are widely differing views on which
empirical observations to use and how to adjust them to a
discount rate relevant to society as a whole. If we use the SRTP
approach, which rate of economic growth should we then
assume for the future and which marginal utility elasticity of
consumption? If we use the SOC approach, which rate of
return should we use? Some consumers borrow on their credit
cards at a rate of 15–25% and save at a rate of 4%. Which rate
reflects their time preference? And should it be before or after
tax?
The standard assumption in neoclassical economics is that
consumers (“homo economicus”) have identical time prefer-
ences that can be represented by exponential discounting.
However, as Samuelson (1937) notes, this is an “axiom”,
“arbitrarily” chosen and not to verify empirically (p. 156).
Nevertheless, this assumption was passed on to the Samuel-
son–Georgescu–Roegen theory of consumption behaviour
(Samuelson, 1938) and further to any branch of mainstream
economics.
Generally, there is very little empirical support for the
assumption that individual time preference can be adequately
described by exponential discounting. On the contrary, for the
near future (0–5 years) individuals seem to discount with
declining discount rates (for an extensive review, see Frederick
et al., 2002). Similarly, Brown and Schaefer (2000) find thatcontradictory to conventional assumptions forward rates in the
bond market are not constant but systematically declining in a
25-yearmaturity perspective due to interest rate volatility. Very
fewstudieshavebeenmadewitha longer timeperspectivebuta
much cited study by Cropper et al. (1992) found in a panel of
citizens similarly declining rates of time preference for govern-
mentprogrammeswith thepurposeof saving lives over a longer
time perspective. The use of lower discount rates for appraisals
of public investments (see Henderson, 1995) also points in that
direction.
When the time perspective is extended beyond the lifetime
of the present and the next generation, additional problems
are added to the choice of discount rate.
With a 5% discount rate, future values are discounted by
95% or more after 60 years. After this point it makes no big
difference whether the benefits of the programme last for 20
or 200 years even when that is the point of the programme.
Thus, the time horizon of the analysis is in effect restricted by
the discount rate. A 10% discount rate reaches 95%-discount-
ing after only 30 years, whereas a 2% discount rate extends
this horizon to 146 years. As pointed out by, e.g., Chichilnisky
(1996, 1997) exponential discounting means that future effects
play no role for the net present value for sufficiently distant
effects of present decisions. In this sense, the present would
exercise dictatorship over the future by letting decisions be
guided only by net present value.
Any investment growing exponentially at a higher rate
than the economy would outgrow it in finite time, which
would produce absurd results. Rabl (1996) notes that long term
discounting with discount rates exceeding the rate of eco-
nomic growth is only possible based on assumptions that are
implausible.
For perspectives beyond 30–40 years, we have little basis for
predicting growth rates and rates of return. The finiteness of
the planet could lead to an S-shaped growth curve flattening
out in the distant future, as has been pointed out by Sterner
(1994). The real rate of return to equity stocks have been higher
thanmarket interest rates for a long time, but this also reflects
an expansion of the corporate sector share of the economy.
This expansion has to cease considerably below 100%.
The logic of discounting changes from the logic of inter-
temporal optimisation of a consumption stream to a logic of
intergenerational distribution of consumption opportunities
when the time perspective is extended to generations that are
separated from the present generation in time. The pure rate
of time preference shifts from a preference for consuming now
rather than later to a preference for our rather than their
consumption. The lack of ethical justification for this prefer-
ence leads often to an assumption of zero for this parameter.
The marginal utility elasticity of consumption on the other
hand reflects that an additional unit of consumption will be
worth less for the future generations than for the present as
they are richer. Therefore, it is ethically justified that
additional consumption opportunities counts less for future
generations than for the present.
The ethical dimensions of this have given rise to Ramsey's
famous view of intergenerational discounting as “ethically
indefensible” and an “expression of lack of imagination”. On
the other hand, not to discount at all would represent a
“dictatorship of the future over the present”. Thus an ethically
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dictatorship is required (Chichilnisky, 1996).
Much of the recent interest for discounting the distant
future has to do with the concern for environmental qualities
the sustaining of which gives the analysis a very long time
perspective.
In addition to the long term perspective, environmental
losses are frequently characterised by their irreversibility. This
irreversibility makes a case for adding an option value to the
preservation of the environmental qualities (Arrow and
Fisher, 1974; Fisher and Krutilla, 1974). This option value can
be expressed in a lower discount rate in cases where such
irreversibilities are involved.
There are also reasons to assume that environmental
qualities share the high income elasticity of a luxury good im-
plying an exponential growth in the opposite direction of the
discount factor (Fisher and Krutilla, 1974; Boiteux, 1976). Solu-
tions to these problems include discounting long term environ-
mental benefits at a low or zero discount rate or accounting
explicitly for the assumed changes in relative utilities.
Finally, it can be argued that the rate of growth or the rate
of return should be adjusted for the environmental effects that
are external to the market. Weitzman (1994) adjusts the
discount rate with an “environmental drag” reflecting the
share of the consumption opportunities necessary to sustain
the environmental qualities in a growing economy. Philibert
(1999) suggests an approach that combines these character-
istics of the environment in a discount rate adjusted for the
lost value of the environmental qualities and obtains a
discount rate that is below the rate of economic growth.
How these forces, which are as time and growth dependent
as the discount rate, should be included is open to debate. The
alternative to adjusting the discount rate for these forces is to
account for them explicitly in the valuation part of the studies.
Argument in favour of this is that it makes the calculus more
transparent and thus the realism of assumptions easier to
assess.3. Hyperbolic discounting: declining discount
rates
Recent economic research has remarkably transformed the
uncertainty about future discount rates from part of the
problem to part of the solution. Gollier (2002) found that
taking risk aversion into account makes a case for declining
discount rates. Weitzman (1998) found that the certainty-
equivalent discount factor is the weighted average of the
possible discount factors. It is not, as frequently implicitly
assumed, the discount factor resulting from a weighted
average of the possible growth rates or rates of return. The
corollary of this is that the discount rate must be declining
from a present level defined with a reasonable degree of
certainty to the lowest imaginable discount rate, possibly
zero, in the distant future.
Thisdiscoveryeither solvesor reducesmanyof theproblems
withexponential discountingdescribedabove. Inaddition to the
uncertainty problem described above, the ethical problems and
the time horizon and growth rate consistency problems are at
least reduced.It also gives rise to the question of how to define the space
of possible future discount rates. One method could be to ask
the only people on earth that could be supposed to have a
qualified idea about it: the economists. Weitzman (2001)
presents a discount factor called “gamma discounting” based
on a questionnaire on distant discount rates from a sample of
the worlds' economists. Alternatively, previous rates of
growth, stock returns, or interest can be used.
According to Newell and Pizer (2003), gamma discounting
assumes a space ofmanypossible, but constant discount rates.
They find this assumption problematic and suggest instead
deriving information about future uncertainty by studying
patterns of variations in real interest rates in the past.
Li and Löfgren (2000) present an alternative approach
where the social optimum is a compromise between a
“utilitarian” representing the present and a “conservationist”
representing the future. Their explorations also result in a
social discount function with declining discount rates. This
result is a contribution to the problem of reconciling the two
contradicting discount functions resulting from the Chichil-
nisky non-dictatorship problem as lined out by Heal (1998).
In a number of European countries, government authori-
ties have recently adjusted their discount rates required for
tax financed investment downwards. Discount rate require-
ments that were settled under impression of the high interest
rate regime of the 80s are in any event hard to justify. Her
Majesty's Treasury (HMT) in the UK has taken one step further.
The formerly high discount rate requirement was among
other reasons motivated by the observed tendency to under-
estimate costs in the investment prospects. This “optimism
bias” is now accounted for explicitly and the required discount
rate is set at 3.5%. However, only for the first 30 years. After
that, it starts to decline, thus following partly Weitzman's
gamma discounting and partly Newell–Pizer's empirical
founding on historical data (Her Majesty's Treasury (HMT),
2004).
Commisariat General du Plan in France has also recently
revised its discount rate recommendation from a uniform 8%
to a two tier approach: 4% in the first 40 years and 2% there-
after (Lebègue et al., 2005). The risk of a two tier solution rather
than a smooth decline is obviously that just around the 40th
year it can mislead recommendations for the time profile of
investment.
The reformulation of the social discount rate requirements
proceeds along three lines. First, the observed propensity to
underestimateproject costs (“optimismbias”) thathas servedas
justification for a high discount rate is treated by taking
uncertainty out of the discount rate and account separately for
it in the cost estimation. Second, the economic discount rate is
more clearly separated from the financial discount rate and is
thus less dependent on periodswith tightmonetary policy such
as the high interest period in the 1980s. Third, the uncertainty
about far future discount rates is reflected in declining discount
rates. These developments are likely to enhance the informa-
tion provided by economic appraisals and make them more
useful in the policy cycle.
Similar authorities in other countries have revised their
discounting guidelines along one or more of these lines or are
considering doing it, whereas others seem reluctant to do it
for various reasons. Probably the most important argument
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inconsistency.4. Time or dynamic inconsistency
The case for this concern is simple to understand. A high
discount rate represents a high degree of impatience and
results in less postponement of consumption and thus less
investment. If the discount rate is declining over time, it will
be high in the first years and low later on at the time of
planning. This could potentially lead to the adoption of a
programme and implementation scheme based on the
assumption that the citizens are willing to invest less in the
early years of the plan andmore later on in plan. Then, as time
passes and it becomes “later on”, citizens will at that time
again have the high short term discount rate and prefer to
postpone costs to the subsequent years.
To some social scientists, these concerns would probably
appear as an overrating of the significance of cost–benefit
analysis in government decision-making to think that the
outcomes of cost benefit analyses really control what govern-
ments do. It is the same as assuming that economic calculus
dominates the political calculus in the policy cycle. However,
in any case time inconsistency implies a risk that the same
government adviser using the samemethod to reassess a plan
that was recommended in the past and has proceeded
according to schedule, when reassessing it, will dismiss the
very same plan as sub-optimal. For no other reason than that
time has passed.
A trivial effect of such an occurrence could be a loss of
confidence in economic appraisals. Amore profound question
is whether it would have consequences for the efficiency of
allocation of productive resources if and when governments
actually follow the economic advice.
Newell and Pizer (2001) argue that “Any desire to revise a
choice made in the past is no longer determined by the mere
passage of time; rather, it is determined by the revelation of
uncertainty about interest rates.” (p. 10). In other words: The
advice at the outset of a programmemay be inconsistent with
the advice at a later point of the implementation phase of the
programme, but both are consistent with an optimal use of
economic resources. This is the result of considering uncer-
tainty about the future returns to alternative uses of the
resources of an economic reality and recognizing that this
uncertainty diminishes as the future gets closer.
But even if they are optimal in this sense, time inconsistent
advice can be a worrying perspective. It could lead to pro-
grammes being initiated, but not fully implemented. Or it
could lead to regretting that a programme was not initiated
decades ago.
In a recent paper Winkler (in press) found that time
inconsistency is indeed a realistic risk of plans or programmes
with an intergenerational time perspective when these are
based on hyperbolic discounting. This assertion is, however,
only valid for plans consisting of actions that are totally
independent and this condition requires some clarification of
what we mean by a “plan” or “programme”. In this paper we
will use the concept of a “plan” or “programme” to designate a
set of means that are perceived necessary to obtain a given setof ends. If the individual means or actions were totally
independent it would not be one, but several plans or pro-
grammes. The idea of making a plan is to identify all the
actions necessary – and only those – to achieve a goal and to
design a practicable scheme of implementing them.
The effect of each step in a plan depends on other steps
in two ways. They can be complementary dependent in the
sense that the effect of one action will not materialise unless
the effects of other actions materialise. Introducing alterna-
tive motor-fuels for example requires a network of filling
stations as well as a fleet of vehicles. The plan will not work
without either of them. They can also be sequentially
dependent in the sense that the effect of action B depends
on the effect of the preceding action A and the subsequent
action C.
This conceptual clarification is important for under-
standing the nature of the costs and benefits of the actions.
For example, a bridge consisting of 10 sections does not
return 90% of the returns to the entire investment if only 9
sections are installed. In the same way, programmes
directed at avoiding a collapse of an ecosystem that almost
succeed are not almost as good as those which succeed. It
is, indeed, the interdependence of the investments that
establishes a need for government planning. If the invest-
ment of each year was independent of the investments of
other years, there would be no reason for planning in the
first place.
There are important differences between financial savings
and the physical and social changes accomplished by the
actions of a plan. Whereas the returns to the savings from this
year can be enjoyed in the future totally independent of the
savings in previous and subsequent years, the effects of
actions in a plan depend on whether the other actions are
successfully carried through. If it is necessary to obtain a par-
ticular stock of financial assets as it is for obtaining an
acceptable living standard when retired, it is necessary to
commit to a pension plan. In a pension plan, the contribution
from each year is necessary to obtain the acceptable standard
of living. If one fails, then, in principle, the standard of living of
the retiree will be unacceptable.
What are the risks of giving time inconsistent advice
concerning a government programme even if implementation
proceeds as planned and nothing else changes except that the
discount rate declines as time passes? Thequestion dissolves in
two sub-questions: What is the risk of dismissing an originally
recommended programme before it is completed? What is the
risk of recommending a time profile for the implementation
plan and then, when it comes to the actual implementation,
recommend another profile?5. Dynamic consistency in the economic
assessment of a coherent plan
Consider a typical plan that gives no reward to investment
before completion of the plan and where past investments
are sunk costs because they are irreversible. They cannot be
converted to financial assets and used for some other
purpose. Assume that the costs and benefits have well





Discounted costs at time τ
Discounted costs at time 0 
T+τ 
Fig. 1 –Comparison of present value of costs at different points of time for any discount function.
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time t=T+1,…, ∞. Assume for simplicity that net-costs are
constant: ct=c=C/(T+ 1). In other words, the total net-effort of
implementing the policy is allocated evenly to all the years
where efforts take place. The net-benefits after time T are
similarly constant, b for all future. The costs and benefits are
discounted to present values with an unspecified discount
function Φ=Φ(t), Φ(0)=1, 0bΦ(t) b1 for tN0, Φ′(t)b0. These
properties are shared by exponential as well as hyperbolic
discount functions.








If the economics of the plan was to be reassessed at a later


















Since the first term on the right hand of Eq. (3) equals the
present value of net-costs in Eq. (2) and the second term on the
right hand is always positive, the net present value of the cost
part of the planwill always be less at any “present” time τ than
at time 0.
The figure below (Fig. 1) shows the discounted costs of the
programme at the outset compared with the discounted costs
for the rest of the programme at time τ.
The figure shows that the discounted costs for the rest of
the implementation period at time τ (the area below the
“Discounted costs at time τ” from τ to T) is smaller than the
discounted costs for the entire implementation period (the
area below “Discounted costs at time 0”). Simply because
the area below “Discounted costs at time τ” to the right of T is
positive and the area below the curves otherwise are identical.From the point of view of time τ, the anticipated benefit








This follows from the fundamental assumption that Φ′(t)b0.
The conclusion is that irrespectively of the chosen discount
function, net present values of a plan described by a constant
annual net-cost from time 0 to T succeeded by a constant
annual net-benefit forever thereafter will tend to increase as
the implementation proceeds and T is approached.
Even if the assumption of constant implementation costs is
relaxed, completion of the programme can be increasingly
attractive. The sunk costs at time τ and the increasing present
value of the benefits allow for some addition to the present
value of the remaining costs of programme before the net
present value changes in a negative direction.6. Time inconsistency concerning the time
profile of costs
Consider now the case of a plan with non-constant costs over
time. This could be the case of development of conversion to
renewable energy technologies. Assume that the first gener-
ation undertakes and finances the development of competi-
tive, the second generation implements them in the energy
system, and the third, and any subsequent generation, enjoys
the opportunity to expand their energy consumption without
jeopardising climate stability, local air pollution, and strategic
independence. It must be admitted that the values of these
opportunities are probably not possible to quantify with any
degree of certainty that makes them applicable for an
economic calculus. But assume that the first generation
bears the largest costs, whereas the second generation only
carries minor net-costs, and the third generation gets net-
benefits. Following the logic in the preceding section, com-
pletion of the plan would appear to be ever more attractive as
the time passes. If it was a beneficial strategy for the first
Table 1 – Changes due to the passing of time of the NPV of a 500 year programme decomposed on phases
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
HMT discounting
Phase 1 −86 7 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 10 10 0 0
Phase 2 −934 −28 −29 −30 −31 −32 −33 −35 −36 −37 −39 12 12
Phase 3 1664 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 21 21 22 22 23
Entire programme 643 −4 −4 −4 −5 −5 −5 −6 −6 −6 −7 34 35
3.5% exponential
Phase 1 −86 7 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 10 10 0 0
Phase 2 −861 −30 −31 −32 −33 −35 −36 −37 −38 −40 −41 9 10
Phase 3 356 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 18 18
Entire programme −590 −10 −11 −11 −11 −12 −12 −13 −13 −14 −14 27 28
Change in units from the preceding year.
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generation to use the technologies because they are already
paid for.
But consider now a programme consisting of three
sequentially dependent phases, which could resemble a
stylised version of the Framework Convention for Climate
Change. The first phase is the formation of global institutions
that enable the global community to control greenhouse gas
emissions in an effective, efficient, and fair manner (Kyoto
protocol). The second phase is that the global community uses
these institutions to actually reduce greenhouse gasses (Post-
Kyoto). In the third phase, theworld economy is delinked from
greenhouse gas emissions, i.e., the economy can growwithout
causing greenhouse gas emissions to grow (delinked economy
future). In this phase, humanity also enjoys the benefit of
being free of risk of man-made disturbance of the radiative
balance beyond the point where it triggers climate changes
that are catastrophic on a global scale. Both types of benefit
are beyond quantification and monetisation, but for this
academic thought experiment, we can assume that there is a
cash equivalent for these qualities.
Assume that the Post-Kyoto phase ismuchmore expensive
than the Kyoto Protocol, whereas all the benefits are harvested
in the distant future. Is it possible that the net present value of
the entire programme would be positive at the start of the
Kyoto Protocol phase, but then become negative as we enter
the more expensive Post-Kyoto phase?
Assume the first phase is 10 years where 10 units are
invested annually. In the second phase 50 units are invested
annually over 50 years. In the third phase, which last
infinitely, benefits of 100 units are enjoyed every year. That
is, we assume that the value of a delinked economy is worth
100 units per year.
The net-present value of the first 500 years of the
programme is −590 units discounted exponentially with a
3.5% discount rate. Discounted with the HMT method (3.5%
the first 30 years, declining to 1% after 300 years), the net
present value becomes positive: 643 units. The contribution to
the net present value of the entire programme from each
phase is shown in the first column (year 0) of Table 1. The
following columns show the changes in the net present value
and the contributions from each phase as time passes.
If we move “the present” from year 0 to year 1 and the 500
year horizon similarly to year 501, the HMT net present value
decreases to by 4 units. As time passes further, we get, in thesame way, a continuously decreasing net present value until
we reach year 10. Beyond that point the net present value
starts to increase again.
The table shows that the contributions of the individual
phases work in opposite direction. The value of phase 1 and
phase 3 increases, but the value of phase 2 decreases more
than the other two phases increase combined. As the more
expensive investments are paid off year by year, we get the
same result as in Eq. (4) above.
Thismechanism is, however, not a speciality for hyperbolic
discounting. The exponential discounting procedure, shown
in parallel in Table 1, produces exactly the same pattern. As
the more expensive phase comes closer in time, its present
value increases and the net present value of the entire
programme becomes still more negative. Until we start to
work ourselves through the second phase.
The conclusion is that time inconsistent advice in a case
with postponed costs can occur. A case with cost figures that
produced a positive net present value in year 0 and a negative
net present value in year 10 could easily be constructed. But
this time inconsistency would be a feature of discounting as
such, not of hyperbolic discounting.
In the cases above the sequential dependency of actions or
phases are given by the physical and social realities of the
world. But what if there are some of the investments that can
be allocated freely over the implementation period and the
planner seeks to maximise net present value, these costs will
be postponed to the latest possible date irrespective of the
discounting method. This could in theory lead to a recom-
mendation of another time profile of implementation at a
later time inconsistent with the original recommendation.
This is a scenario, which is familiar in daily life household
decisions aswell as in decisions at organisational levels. Strotz
(1955) refers to this as the act of a “naïve planner”. The planner
optimises net present value without due regard for the nature
of discounting. Exactly because it is normal, it is also normal
for the planner to take into account the possibility of time
inconsistency in the programming. This is done by engaging in
“commitments” in which case we have a “sophisticated
planner”. Strotz (1955) compares this behaviour to Ulysses
who asked his men to tie him to the mast.
There is a large literature of evidence that individuals
discount the future according to a declining discount rate, that
they behave time inconsistently (reviewed in Frederick et al.,
2002), and that they therefore engage (voluntarily) in
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(see Strotz, 1955 and Elster, 2000 for some important contribu-
tions). These commitments can take a wide variety of forms
including measures like eliminating options, imposing costs,
setting up rewards, creating delays, and even inducing
ignorance. Governments can also consider these voluntary
commitments insufficient and add requirements as for
instance on mortgage amortisation, durability, and scale.
Whereas most of the economic literature focuses on
commitments that households engage in, it is also normal
procedure in government to institutionalise policies. These
institutionalisations of policies include, for instance, broad
(bipartisan, cross party) or even consensus based agreements
in parliament, international agreements (like the Kyoto
Protocol), delegation of decision power to government inde-
pendent institutions (like central banks) with predefined
decision rules, budget rules (e.g., the growth and stability
agreement in Europe) and many other arrangements.
The reasons for institutionalising policies in these forms
are, however, not time inconsistency due to discounting, but
rather due to the possibility of changing political priorities. An
uncertainty that otherwise would undermine the credibility of
long term policies.7. Conclusions
The conclusion is that the fear of introducing a time inconsis-
tency in long termplanningwhen using hyperbolic discounting
is exaggerated.
First, the uncertainty of the economic development in the
distant future is a reality that means that certainty-equivalent
ratesof growthand returns to capital are declining in thedistant
future. If it is a reality, thennot taking it into account necessarily
leads to sub-optimal decisions.
Second, completion of programmes defined as series of
actions that are sequentially or complementary necessary to
attain a particular goal will be increasingly attractive as the
activities are carried through as long as the associated costs are
constant and can be considered sunk costs.
Third, time inconsistency canoccur in the recommendations
for the time profile of implementationwhen these are based on
any discounting procedure. This problem is, however, not
difficult to overcome as long as it is known to the planner and
engaging in commitments that “insure” against time inconsis-
tency is normal procedure in government.R E F E R E N C E S
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